

# Appendix B – BRDHD Handling of Suspicious Packages and Bomb Threats



## Commonwealth of Kentucky Guidelines for Handling Suspicious Packages/Substances

*Important: Notify law enforcement immediately for suspicious, unopened packages*

### Notification

For incidents involving UNKNOWNs, the responding agency should notify the **State 24 Hour Warning Point (SWP) at 1-800-255-2587 or (502) 607-1638**. An Incident Number will be assigned, proper notifications made, and assets deployed, if needed. The following information should be communicated to the SWP State Duty Officer:

- Location of the incident (county, address, and specific building location and room number).
- Was the package/letter opened? Was there any threat inside?
- How many people were potentially exposed? Is anyone symptomatic?
- Is decontamination required? If yes, how many people will be, or have been, decontaminated?
- Is anyone being transported to the hospital?
- What agencies are on scene?
- Who is conducting the field screening?

### Response

- The State Duty Officer will contact the FBI WMD Coordinator and notify the appropriate state agencies.
- The FBI WMD Coordinator, in collaboration with responders on scene, will determine if field screening and follow-on response activities are required, see the flowchart in Attachment 1.
- All samples **MUST** be transported by a sworn LEO or a 41<sup>st</sup> CST member.

### Laboratory Requirements

- All samples **MUST** have an Incident Number before they can be accepted for testing!
- All samples should be taken to the South Loading Dock at the State Public Health Laboratory, 100 Sower Blvd, Frankfort, KY 40601 between 8:00 A.M. and 4:30 P.M. Other delivery times should be coordinated through the SWP or FBI WMD Coordinator.
- **Important:** Do not take samples to the main entrance of the State Public Health Laboratory.

### Laboratory Checklist

Field personnel should use this checklist to properly package samples that are being delivered to the State Public Health Laboratory. If assistance is required, contact State Public Health Laboratory.

**Field Screening**

Radiological  Chemical  Explosives  Biological (optional)

**Package Size:** Packaging should not exceed 8"H x 10"D x 15"L

**Packaging**

- Double-bag samples for transport.
- Exclude gloves, paper towels, cleaning materials, etc.
- Decontaminate outer packaging (i.e., 10% bleach solution)

*Note: Do not submit suspected ricin samples in glass containers – use sterile plastic containers.*

**Laboratory Tracking:** Contact the SWP to obtain an Incident Number. This will be used to track lab samples.


**Forms**

- Chain of Custody Form with assigned Incident Number
- Required laboratory forms (will be provided when the sample is transferred to the laboratory's custody).
- Documented field screening results

24 Hr State Warning Point(SWP)	FBI WMD Coordinator	State Public Health Laboratory
(800) 255-2587 or (502) 607-1638	(502) 263-8000	(502) 564-4446 (work hours) (502) 545-1782 (after work hours)

ATTACHMENT 1

Handling of Suspicious Packages and Substances Flowchart





**Kentucky Department for Public Health  
Division of Laboratory Services – Preparedness Section**

**ENVIRONMENTAL (BT)  
CHECKLIST:**

**TRIAGE:**

- Chemical
- Radiological
- Explosives
- Biological

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*Field personnel will screen or assess the sample for Chemical, Radiological, Biological, or explosive devices before sample can be transported to the laboratory for testing.*

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**SIZE:**  8"H x 10"D x 15"L  
(maximum size)

**PACKAGING:**

- Double bagged/contained
  - Exclude gloves/cleaning materials (DO NOT SEND)
  - Outer packaging decontaminated  
(i.e. 10% bleach solution)
- \*\*See below**

**TRACKING:**

EOC # (Call EOC: [800-255-2587](tel:800-255-2587) or [502-607-1630](tel:502-607-1630) to obtain #)

**FORMS:**

- Chain of Custody (maintain one for your agency)
- Required forms for the laboratory will be provided when the specimen is transferred to their custody.

**Please do not take samples to the front door. All samples should be taken by law enforcement to the South Loading Dock at the Centralized Laboratory Services, 100 Sower Blvd, Frankfort, KY 40601 between 8 AM & 4:30 PM. Other delivery times should be coordinated through the EOC or WMD Coordinator.**

**\*\* If Ricin or SEB is suspected, do not submit samples in glass.**

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November 2, 2004



***This is an FBI – DHS – HHS/CDC Coordinated Document***

**Guidance on Initial Responses to a Suspicious Letter / Container  
With a Potential Biological Threat**

A large number of potentially suspicious letters and packages continue to be reported to federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies nationwide. In some instances these letters or packages may include powders, liquids, or other materials. Federal, state, and local response agencies should be mindful of the potential for small-scale exposure, which could result from material contained in threatening or suspicious packages. While this guidance is generally focused on the initial response to potential biological threats, all personnel responding to such incidents must be aware of the potential for exposure to hazardous chemical and/or radiological materials in addition to biological hazards. Additionally, there may be a threat posed from secondary releases or devices. Consistent with established protocols, response agencies should follow standard law enforcement procedures and hazard risk assessments in response to calls, and should pre-identify the relevant local public health points of contact to be notified in the event of a potential bioterrorism event.

The following guidelines are recommendations for local responders, based on existing procedures (including recommendations from the International Association of Fire Chiefs). This document provides guidance on the initial response to a suspicious letter/container, while other follow-on response plans, such as portions of the National Response Plan (NRP), may be utilized if a threat is deemed credible. In general, these potential threats or incidents fall into one of five general scenarios. They are as follows:

**1. Letter/container with unknown powder-like substance and threatening communication (with or without illness):**

Since there is an articulated threat, it is likely that the substance was intentionally introduced into the package in an effort to validate that threat. An articulated threat itself (with or without the presence of a suspicious substance) is a federal crime and may also constitute a violation under state and local statutes. The local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Coordinator and/or FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), a certified HAZMAT

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### **4. Letter/container with no visible powder, no threat, but recipients are ill:**

This scenario has the most potential for ambiguity and confusion. Those who come in contact with *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax), or other biological pathogens/toxins, may not immediately appear symptomatic. Although no powder or substance may be available to be collected for environmental testing, public health officials may decide to utilize clinical samples from potentially exposed individuals. Additionally, in this scenario it may be difficult to determine if a letter/container is actually associated with the illness. As there is no specific threat to investigate, this is primarily a public health and medical issue; but this scenario also represents a potential criminal act that should be jointly investigated by public health and law enforcement. The initial notifications will largely be the same as scenario #1, with public health taking a primary role in the response. While the primary concern is the treatment and well-being of the recipient, public health and law enforcement should maintain close contact, while public health determines the nature of the illness and law enforcement examines any relevant intelligence. Depending on the scale and nature of the incident, if HHS/CDC is notified they will maintain close contact and coordinate with DHS. If a potential criminal nexus is identified, the FBI will conduct an initial threat assessment and initiate appropriate actions and notifications listed under scenario #1.

### **5. Letter/container arrives with no powder, no threat, the recipient is not ill, but the recipient is concerned about the package:**

With strict regard to federal criminal statutes, no investigative actions are necessary in this matter. However, if other threat indicators are present such as excess postage, misspelled names, unusual odors/colors, etc., law enforcement and the United States Postal Inspection Service should be notified to evaluate it for potential hazards. If the assessment determines that the letter/container is "suspicious," then appropriate steps outlined in scenario #1 would be initiated.

### **Critical Response Issues for Scenario #1:**

1. Request the assistance of the nearest certified hazardous materials response team to conduct risk assessments, field safety screening, sample (evidence) collection, decontamination, and other mitigation activities. Any sample (evidence) collection must be coordinated with law enforcement (FBI).
2. Notify appropriate law enforcement (local, state and local FBI WMD coordinator/JTTF, postal inspectors) when a potential threat is identified.
3. Do not touch, move, or open any suspicious package until an initial hazard risk assessment of the package can be performed in coordination with HAZMAT personnel and law enforcement.

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4. An initial threat credibility assessment will be coordinated via the local FBI WMD Coordinator and the FBI Counterterrorism Division's Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU). This will include the FBI Laboratory Division, Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) and other select interagency subject matter experts, tailored for the specific threat. This assessment includes an analysis of technical feasibility, operational practicability, behavioral resolve, and examination of any intelligence that might relate to the threat. If the threat is determined to be credible, other appropriate federal agencies will be notified, to include DHS and HHS/CDC. Additional information on this process is available from the NRP, including the Biological Annex and Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.

5. Contact your local public health department (who should in turn notify state authorities and the CDC) if there is a threat of public health exposure or environmental contamination exists. HHS/CDC will then notify the HSOC, where appropriate.

6. In coordination with law enforcement, always notify the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, whenever it appears that the threat was delivered through the U.S. Postal Service. Assist with ensuring that origin and tracking information is obtained from the package (ideally, photographs of the front and back).

7. Treat the scene as a crime scene. Preserve evidence in coordination with law enforcement and ensure that materials are safely packaged. Take steps to retain enough suspicious material for:

- a. Laboratory analysis;
- b. Forensic examination of criminal evidence, regardless of whether the threat is ultimately determined to be accompanied by a hazardous material.

8. Transfer custody of evidence to a law enforcement officer as soon as possible. Maintain chain of custody by obtaining a record of names and signatures every time custody of a suspicious material or sample for laboratory analysis changes hands.

9. Perform basic field safety screening of the substance to rule out explosives, radiation, flammability, corrosives, and volatile organic compounds prior to transporting the materials to the appropriate LRN, as coordinated with the FBI WMD Coordinator. All field safety screening that is performed by responders should be clearly documented and shared with law enforcement and the LRN.

10. In coordination with the local FBI WMD Coordinator (and/or a responding law enforcement entity), transport samples to the designated CDC-qualified LRN facility. If field safety screening detects the presence of chemical or radiological hazards, the FBI WMD Coordinator will contact FBI Headquarters for guidance

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regarding which laboratory is appropriate to perform the analysis. This will be done as part of the threat credibility assessment process noted above (see #4).

11. In coordination with public health and law enforcement, identify and list the names and contact information for anyone who may have been exposed to the suspicious substance so that they may be contacted when the LRN test results are available or if there is other additional information. If positive results are obtained, state and local public health departments will need to contact those potentially exposed as soon as possible to provide appropriate assistance (e.g., antibiotics, education, additional testing, vaccination, surveillance/symptom reporting).

12. In coordination with the FBI, identify a single point-of-contact for incident follow-up.

13. If LRN tests identify positive results for threat agents or a threat is determined to be credible, the FBI will immediately notify the DHS and other appropriate federal agencies to initiate relevant NRP actions, as necessary. The DHS will work closely with the FBI, HHS/CDC and other agencies to ensure a coordinated response.

### Note on field screening

Once activities are complete to address immediate public safety concerns, every effort must be made to preserve evidence necessary for public health and law enforcement investigations.

In situations where biological threat agents are suspected, the item(s) should be field safety screened and immediately transported in law enforcement custody to an LRN laboratory. This should be done in coordination with the local FBI WMD Coordinator.

**Field safety screening should be limited to ruling out explosive devices, radiological materials, corrosive materials and volatile organic compounds. Currently, there are no definitive field tests for identifying biological agents. Additional field testing can mislead response efforts by providing incorrect or incomplete results, and destroy limited materials critical for definitive laboratory testing required to facilitate any appropriate public health and law enforcement response.**

This information is provided for guidance. Questions related to the content of this document can be addressed to: Scott Steele, Ph.D., Counterterrorism Division, WMD Countermeasures Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, E-mail: [ss Steele2@leo.gov](mailto:ss Steele2@leo.gov).

# Bomb Threat Checklist



Department of the Treasury  
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms  
**BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST**



1. When is the bomb going to explode?
2. Where is the bomb right now?
3. What does the bomb look like?
4. What kind of bomb is it?
5. What will cause the bomb to explode?
6. Did you place the bomb?
7. Why?
8. What is address?
9. What is your name?

**EXACT WORDING OF BOMB THREAT:**

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Sex of caller: \_\_\_\_\_ Race: \_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_ Length of call: \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone number at which call is received: \_\_\_\_\_

Time call received: \_\_\_\_\_

Date call received: \_\_\_\_\_

**CALLER'S VOICE**

<input type="checkbox"/> Calm	<input type="checkbox"/> Nasal
<input type="checkbox"/> Soft	<input type="checkbox"/> Angry
<input type="checkbox"/> Stutter	<input type="checkbox"/> Loud
<input type="checkbox"/> Excited	<input type="checkbox"/> Lisp
<input type="checkbox"/> Laughter	<input type="checkbox"/> Slow
<input type="checkbox"/> Rasp	<input type="checkbox"/> Crying
<input type="checkbox"/> Rapid	<input type="checkbox"/> Deep
<input type="checkbox"/> Normal	<input type="checkbox"/> Distinct

<input type="checkbox"/> Slurred	<input type="checkbox"/> Whispered
<input type="checkbox"/> Ragged	<input type="checkbox"/> Clearing Throat
<input type="checkbox"/> Deep Breathing	<input type="checkbox"/> Cracking Voice
<input type="checkbox"/> Disguised	<input type="checkbox"/> Accent
<input type="checkbox"/> Familiar ( <i>If voice is familiar, who did it sound like?</i> ) _____	

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**BACKGROUND SOUNDS:**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Street noises	<input type="checkbox"/> Factory machinery
<input type="checkbox"/> Voices	<input type="checkbox"/> Crockery
<input type="checkbox"/> Animal noises	<input type="checkbox"/> Clear
<input type="checkbox"/> PA System	<input type="checkbox"/> Static
<input type="checkbox"/> Music	<input type="checkbox"/> House noises
<input type="checkbox"/> Long distance	<input type="checkbox"/> Local
<input type="checkbox"/> Motor	<input type="checkbox"/> Office machinery
<input type="checkbox"/> Booth	<input type="checkbox"/> Other ( <i>Please specify</i> ) _____

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**BOMB THREAT LANGUAGE:**

<input type="checkbox"/> Well spoken (education)	<input type="checkbox"/> Incoherent
<input type="checkbox"/> Foul	<input type="checkbox"/> Message read by threat maker
<input type="checkbox"/> Taped	<input type="checkbox"/> Irrational

**REMARKS:**

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Your name:**

\_\_\_\_\_

**Your position:**

\_\_\_\_\_

**Your telephone number:**

\_\_\_\_\_

**Date checklist completed:** \_\_\_\_\_

ATF F 1613.1 (Formerly ATF F 1730.1, which still may be used) (6-97)

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